Democracy Reporting International (DRI) operates on the conviction that democratic, participatory governance is a human right and governments should be accountable to their citizens. DRI supports democratic governance around the world with a focus on institutions of democracy, such as constitutions, elections, parliaments and rules of democracy grounded in international law. Through careful assessments based on field research with partners, DRI convenes diverse stakeholders to promote policies that strengthen democratic institutions. A non-profit company, DRI is based in Berlin and has offices in Tunisia, Lebanon, Ukraine, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar.
The social media sphere is managed by a handful of big companies, which have only belatedly woken up to the challenge and started to tighten user policies and to give more attention to paid or unpaid content on their services. Often, they frame the problem in biological terms ("healthy debate") or vague terms like "positive" discourse, rather than acknowledging that discourse is a social interaction for which a rights-based approach is appropriate, which can draw on an already agreed framework and international legal obligations. As the formation of opinion is part of international human rights obligations, the role of social media is a legitimate aspect of international election observation. Furthermore, there is massive public interest in the issue; if international election observation does not address the role of social media, it risks missing an important element of the process and thereby relevance.
While systematic research is still at the beginning, there is no doubt that social media have an impact in forming opinions.
Currently election observers are set-up to detect traditional manipulations, say ballot box stuffing or a dominance of the ruling party in the public media, but they are not set up to monitor, understand and report on a serious disinformati- The subject is therefore acute for the election observation community. It is long accepted that the public discourse and debate around elections is an essential part of any electoral process.
It is for this reason that election observation missions conduct systematic monitoring of traditional media sources. This area of the 'horizontal effect' of human rights is complex and depends on practices in each state.
While these cannot be explored in this paper, an argument can be made that governments have an obligation to ensure that social media companies organise discourse on their platforms in a manner that does not unduly distort or allow manipulative interference in order to guarantee proper public participation in electoral processes. • The need to have policies and processes that ensure human rights conformity (no. 15).
• Human rights due diligence (no. 18): Business should track and analyse its impact, remedy problems and monitor their effectiveness.
• Report publicly on human rights impact and measures taken (no. 21).
• unlikely that the electorate has a concern about fraud (whether that is justified or not).
The following projects are noteworthy from having looked specifically at social media conduct in elections:
DEMOS 2005 Nigerian Elections
DEMOS purpose was not specifically to add to election observation methodology but to test a "a novel way to research and understand attitudes, trends and media consumption" glish-language tweets from 1,24 million users during one month in the run-up to the elections as well as almost 2 million comments in Facebook. The data was automatically classified and among the main findings was the fact that hate speech was not much used, but that there was a wide-ranging discussion of electoral violence.
The report points out that social media monitoring can effective in detecting rapidly rumours.
As the spreading of rumours and false stories is part of the disinformation playbook, this aspect of monitoring is particularly relevant.
The DEMOS study is recommended reading to better understand the technical challenges and solutions to analysis of social media data and a discussion on their overall use. Importantly only public data should be scraped. 
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